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A piece of the international financial architecture is missing, one that would 
facilitate more effective, fair and timely sovereign debt workouts than the ad hoc, 
inconsistent and sometimes highly political processes that are applied today. While a 
newly created mechanism should be available to any sovereign government, including 
in Europe, special concerns have been voiced, as in the convoking of this conference, 
for improving debt workouts in low and middle-income countries, where crisis-related 
declines in living standards that are part and parcel of sovereign debt crises are hardest 
to bear. The desirability of having such a mechanism was globally agreed by heads of 
state and their finance and foreign ministers at the Monterrey Summit on Financing for 
Development in 2002,
2
 and serious discussions about creating such a mechanism took 
place at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2002-3, albeit without reaching 
agreement. It was not the first time that the matter was addressed internationally. 
Efforts were made to create international debt workout mechanisms in 1907 (Hague 
Convention), 1933 (Montevideo Pan American Conference), 1942 (early stages of 
Bretton Woods), 1978 (UNCTAD agreed guidelines), 1996 (HIPC for poorest 
countries), as well as the IMF initiative in 2002-3 (SDRM).
3
 If a permanent global 
instrument has not yet been created, can it still happen? Yes, global institutional 
changes do happen, albeit only when the conditions are ripe. This paper argues that 
launching an initiative at this time would be opportune.  
The ensuing discussion first suggests that while the developing country debt 
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situation is no longer making headlines, it is a good time to consider creating a 
mechanism for use when the situation becomes less benign. It then reviews the existing 
mechanisms for sovereign debt workouts and the limited contributions made (and 
feasible) from voluntary codes of good conduct, and thus why it is appropriate to think 
about creation of a new mechanism. It goes on to describe the characteristics that an 
appropriate sovereign debt workout mechanism should have. It should be a single 
mechanism, available to all countries, albeit with different configurations of creditors 
engaging in workouts for lowest-income than for other countries. The paper concludes 
by arguing that there are not only economic systemic and fairness reasons, but also 
political ones, for launching a new debt policy initiative now.  
The current situation 
At the time of writing this paper, there has been great effort in the European 
Union to treat the sovereign debt difficulties in several countries as liquidity problems 
that can be addressed with official financing and domestic policy adjustments and no 
restructuring of the debt or even postponing  of the debt servicing. Financial markets 
have, till now,  not been convinced, judging by the high yields on the bonds of the 
affected countries. However, in contrast to the unfolding European drama, this is a 
period of relative calm as regards developing country debt, despite the recent stresses of 
the global financial and economic situation. Only five countries are currently in “debt 
distress” meaning they are not fully meeting their debt-servicing obligations (see box).
4
 
However, the IMF and World Bank classified 15 countries as at “high risk” of debt 
distress and 24 countries at “moderate risk,” which is an indicator of vulnerability 
should the world economy experience another major economic or financial shock, or 
should the countries suffer a natural calamity or other major external shock. Indeed, 
several of the countries listed in the box are elsewhere classified as “small vulnerable 
economies” (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010).  
On the one hand, in other words, it is not expected that the fiscal and financial 
strains even in the “high risk” countries will reach the crisis point in the near term. On 
the other hand, developing countries have been urged, as by IMF, to rebuild the 
“macroeconomic policy buffers” that they drew upon during the recent crisis to be able 
to defend themselves again against potential future shocks (IMF 2010b). Defaults 
cannot be ruled out, especially when one cannot rule out new natural calamities, linked 
for example to climate change, let alone terms-of-trade shocks, as stemming from 
international food and fuel price volatility (and especially rising cost of oil and food in 
the recent months), nor what impact a spreading European debt crisis, should it explode 
on the scene, might have on the world economy. The essence of economic catastrophes 
is that most economic actors do not expect them. Indeed, the short-term outlook for 
developing countries, including the least developed countries, is currently quite 
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respectively in those years (United Nations, 2011). 
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Another characteristic of the current situation is that there is widespread 
acceptance – at least outside the financial industry itself – of the need for systemic 
reform of the international financial architecture. The proposals that have been debated 
intensively since 2008 are meant to moderate some aspects of the volatility and 
generally reduce vulnerability to financial crises. They also address mechanisms for 
financial institution rescues from financial crises, which bear on risks of sovereign 
insolvency, as governments have no choice but to act to keep their financial systems 
functioning and thus in one way or another take over private financial sector 
obligations. And yet, actual international policy reforms have been relatively limited or 
slated for delayed implementation, and governments are again largely on their own to 
build their policy “buffers,” as noted above. Indeed, because there is much legitimate 
concern with the potential volatility of international financial flows, governments of 
several emerging economies have introduced controls on capital movements.
6
 Some 
years ago, such policies would have been considered an unacceptable distortion of 
efficient financial markets, which are now deemed less efficient and potentially 
dangerous. By the same token, arguments for “market-based solutions” to sovereign 
debt crises should be reexamined. 
In other words, owing to the extensive commercial bank holdings of sovereign 
debts and the reality that banking systems are contingent liabilities of governments, 
appropriate resolution of sovereign debt crises is of systemic importance to the national 
economy of every sovereign, including low and lower middle-income countries, 
especially where governments have issued increasing amounts of domestic debt in 
recent years that is held by local and foreign financial institutions. If a debtor country is 
large and its debts are held around the world, or if a crisis in one country spreads to 
other countries deemed in the same “asset class”, the global financial system itself may 
be endangered. Today, there is a concrete concern of this latter type in Europe.  
Entering today into a new debt reform initiative could be of assistance in 
resolving current crises in Europe.
7
 However, given inevitable lags in developing and 
implementing a new mechanism, it would more likely be applied in the next wave of 
country difficulties. The point is to have that mechanism available when countries need 
it and for the financial markets and official creditors to know ahead of time what the 
“rules of the game” will be. The proposal is thus to add a sovereign debt workout 
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8
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Box. Countries currently identified as at risk of debt distress 
 
Under the joint IMF and World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income 
countries, explicit assessments are made of country exposure to the risk of a sovereign debt crisis. 
The assessment is not made for all countries but for 72 countries that qualify to draw from the 
IMF‟s special concessional lending facility, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (IMF, 2010). 
The assessment is meant to help inform official donors whether it is advisable to extend further 
assistance in the form of grants as opposed to loans that, however concessional, increase the 
receiving country‟s stock of outstanding debt. It is also meant to help governments manage their 
debt and fiscal situations. It is understood to be a rough measure (less nuanced than bond-rating 
agency assessments, the latter of which are also highly imperfect), and not an unconditional 
forecast, serving rather as a basis for policy discussions. 
There are four classifications in the debt sustainability analyses (DSA). Countries are 
classified as being “in debt distress” if they are presently not meeting all their external debt-
servicing obligations. All other classifications refer to the findings of the most recent country DSA 
(in the listing below, almost all were undertaken in 2010 or 2011). The assessments are in terms of 
whether projected values of specific debt or debt service indicators exceed common trigger values, 
themselves a function of a separate evaluation by the World Bank Staff of the quality of the 
country‟s policies and institutions. Countries judged to have “weak” policies and institutions are 
expected to face repayment problems at lower debt indicator levels than countries with “strong” 
policies and institutions. Countries are classified as at “high risk” if the “baseline” scenario for the 
next 20 years as calculated for each country shows a “protracted breach” of the relevant thresholds. 
Importantly, however, high-risk countries are currently fully servicing their debt. Countries are 
classified as at “moderate risk” if their debt indicators over 20 years are below the thresholds in the 
baseline scenario, but they exceed them in an “alternative” scenario, signaling vulnerability to 
“external shocks or abrupt changes in macroeconomic policies” (IMF 2011). Countries are 
classified as “low risk” if both baseline and alternative scenarios are well below the threshold levels. 
Based on the country listing of assessments as of May 15, 2011, 4 countries were classified 
as in debt distress, 15 as having “high risk” and 24 others as at moderate risk, as follows: 
In debt distress: Comoros, Guinea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe  
At high risk: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d‟Ivoire,* Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, The Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lao 
Peoples Democratic Republic, São Tomé and Principe, Tajikistan, Tonga, and 
Republic of Yemen 
At moderate risk: Benin, Bhutan, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Republic of Congo, Dominica, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Nepal, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
and Togo 
__________ 
* Côte d‟Ivoire could be reclassified as in debt distress as it defaulted on its Eurobond during the disputed 




Inferiority of the existing system 
In a typical case of corporate insolvency, the debtor seeks “protection” from its 
creditors in a special bankruptcy court. The bankrupt firm will not have enough assets 
that can be liquidated to pay off the firm‟s outstanding obligations and the creditors 
thus have a collective interest in the court overseeing an orderly and comprehensive 
bankruptcy workout either to wind up the firm and share what assets it does have with 
the creditors according to the seniority of their claims or to refloat the firm if it is 
deemed viable after reducing its debt to a level that is believed sustainable, with 
creditor losses again apportioned in light of seniority. Neither owners nor managers 
seek bankruptcy protection lightly. Shareholders usually lose their entire stake in the 
firm and senior managers are typically fired; workers lose their jobs and possibly their 
pensions. Individual creditors might at first prefer to rush to court to press their 
individual claims, but very quickly that becomes untenable as the claims are too large. 
Moreover, in the interests of the creditors and other stakeholders in the firm (including 
the tax authorities), the bankruptcy court will act to at least temporarily preserve what 
they can of the firm, for example, preventing asset stripping by management. If the firm 
is to be rescued, the court oversees the early stages of the recovery process, until the 
firm “emerges from bankruptcy protection.” Importantly, while the court operates so as 
to maximize recovery of creditor assets, it is independent of the creditors and is guided 
by laws, principles of justice and the national interest, the latter especially germane 
when an economically important firm is at stake. 
None of this applies to a case of sovereign insolvency (Kargman, 2005). There 
is no international court in which a government can seek protection from its foreign 
creditors. There is also no court in the country of the creditors that can force a foreign 
government to repay its loans (at least as long as the government has moved its 
“commercial” assets out of the reach of governments that might seek to enforce a 
judgment made in its court system; “diplomatic” assets cannot be impounded). Instead, 
the debtor government informs its private and official creditors that it cannot make 
payments falling due and seeks assistance in correcting its fiscal imbalances, usually in 
an adjustment program with the IMF, which also makes loans to the country provided it 
meets the policy conditions the IMF requires. From that point on, decisions are made 
by creditors or international institutions controlled by creditor governments, in varying 
degrees of negotiation with the debtor government. The exceptions involve important 
debtor governments that can push back by taking unilateral action, such as Argentina 
and the Russian Federation, or that strike when the creditors and their governments are 
otherwise preoccupied, as in Ecuador in 2009 (see below). 
The sovereign debt workout process is thus an informal arrangement among 
interested parties, unlike under a bankruptcy court. Informal arrangements happen as 
well in corporate insolvencies of the relief and rescue mode. However, there are two 
essential differences in the corporate case. One is that the parties are working “in the 
shadow” of the bankruptcy law, meaning that if the voluntary process fails the formal 
(and more expensive) bankruptcy process will be invoked. They may thus voluntarily 
negotiate toward a solution that is similar to that of the court. The other major 
difference is that the public interest in the outcome of the corporate case is generally 
less intense than in the sovereign one, where serious deterioration in the wellbeing of a 
broad swath of the population hinges on the degree to which they bear the burden of the 
workout. In other words, there is a deep political and humanitarian interest in how 
 6 
 
much sacrifice is made and by which population strata in mobilizing the fiscal 
resources for post-workout debt servicing.  
 As most governments have a substantial number of creditors, groups of 
creditors have organized themselves to protect their interests. In the case of creditors of 
low-income countries, most of the sovereign debts are loans from other governments 
(including export credits extended by banks but taken over by official agencies that had 
guaranteed those debts when the debtor defaults), and multilateral institutions. The debt 
workout thus involves arrangements among governments, with bilateral creditors 
typically represented by the informal Paris Club, which establishes common principles 
for fair burden sharing among its members and, as they are creditors, seeks to minimize 
the relief given to the debtor.
9
 In strategically important cases, the standard rules are not 
followed and greater relief is given. In politically important cases of a different sort, in 
particular, for the countries that were the focus of the massive global “Jubilee 
Campaign” to deepen debt reductions of the poorest and most heavily indebted 
countries in the world, the Paris Club agreed to increasingly deeper relief. Multilateral 
debt obligations were reduced through donor contributions and use of profits of the 
institutions in separate initiatives (Cosío-Pascal, 2010).  
The Paris Club has also sought to take a leading role in determining the amount 
of relief for countries that are not in the special category of Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs), or that require assistance after successfully exiting the HIPC 
process. However, in seeking to apply its “Evian Principles,” the Club has to rely on the 
goodwill of private creditors, which often have much larger exposure to the debtor 
country than the Paris Club creditors, as well as that of non-Paris Club official 
creditors, as from Middle-Eastern and emerging market countries. Indeed, either the 
Paris Club widens its membership to include the rising non-member official creditors or 
it will see its influence significantly diminish.  
In fact, private creditors have no obligation to offer “comparable treatment” to 
that of the Paris Club creditors (although the debtor government is obligated to seek it) 
and in most cases they do not look to Paris for leadership in this regard. Since the 
1980s, commercial bank creditors have organized their negotiations with sovereigns in 
crisis through informal and ad hoc groups called “London Clubs” or bank steering 
committees. Bondholders, now the dominant source of private credit, organize 
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 This is not to say that Paris Club negotiators are not concerned with the social and economic cost of 
servicing debt for developing countries; only that they represent the interests of creditor agencies, albeit 
sometimes tempered by the interests of the development cooperation ministry. 
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workout. The fear was that holdout creditors could disrupt a restructuring that most bondholders were 
willing to accept, as New York law bonds required unanimity to change these terms (but not other 
terms). In fact, lawyers for the debtor governments had devised a strategy to overcome this problem, 
known as “exit consents.” Moreover, there is strong reason to believe the whole effort was largely a 
tactic by the financial industry to kill the IMF‟s proposed SDRM, which it helped to do (see Gelpern and 
Gulati, 2010). Nevertheless, this experience shows that more radical proposals, like SDRM, can help 
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There are thus potentially several different creditor groups spread around the 
world, some only loosely organized, with which the debtor needs to settle. In practice, 
the debtor government consults with its various creditor groups in seeking the best 
overall package it can obtain given its usually poor bargaining position.  
In this context, IMF – working closely with the World Bank in low-income 
country cases – plays a central role in assessing how much relief is deemed warranted, 
as well as the amount of new loan and grant financing to extend to the debtor country 
during its economic adjustment period. Neither Paris Club nor private creditors nor the 
debtor government need base their debt restructuring negotiations on the IMF 
assessment, but it does de facto serve as a benchmark. In this regard, IMF formally 
represents the global public interest, although its governance structure gives effective 
control to the creditor governments and it is perpetually criticized by global civil 
society organizations for having a pro-creditor bias and tolerating deep social distress in 
debt-crisis countries.  
Except in the case of the HIPCs, where the Fund and Bank take the lead, the 
debtor government coordinates its own debt workout. It may seek a “cooperative” 
workout with major groups of creditors or adopt “unilateral” strategies to seek a better 
outcome from its perspective, for example sequencing the order of creditor classes with 
which it negotiates, demanding smaller concessions from the creditor groups with 
which it needs to settle first.
11
 The process can also be quite drawn out. As of May 
2011, Argentina had still not settled with the Paris Club on the official creditor part of 
its 2001 default (although discussions were underway), and it took seemingly endless 




The private creditor community has argued that it is in the interest of sovereign 
borrowers to develop a cooperative relationship with its creditors during good times to 
draw upon in bad times. Moreover, it is said that confident creditors would lend more 
and on easier terms to debtors that built a transparent relationship of trust. Codes of 
good conduct have been proposed to delineate the cooperative relationship, a key 
feature of which is frequent government communication of information and policy 
intentions to its creditors. The most prominent code, which is advocated by the Institute 
of International Finance (IIF), an international association of the world‟s major banks 
(which also acts as a lobbying group for their interests), holds out a promise that a 
debtor with a history of cooperation in good times and that makes credible pledges of 
adjustment policy reforms when times turn bad will be able to tap private bank funds 
even during a period of debt distress and will more quickly return to general financial 
market access after having been excluded during the depths of its crisis. However, these 
benefits of transparency are a forecast, not a commitment. Meanwhile, the debtor 
government is asked to commit to its part of the code. In this and other ways, critics 
have found this code biased towards creditor interests (Herman 2010). Other codes, as 
developed by civil society organizations, are more balanced, paying greater attention, 
                                                                                                                                              
speed adoption of useful if limited change (collective action clauses) that was previously seen as 
unnecessary and risky. 
11
 See Damill, Frenkel and Rapetti (2010) for the case of Argentina after 2001 and Gorbunov (2010) for 
the Russian workout at the end of the 1990s. 
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 For the case of Ethiopia‟s 12 years of Paris Club debt renegotiation between 1992 and 2004, followed 
by the 2005 unilateral Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative and the country‟s arrangements with non-Paris 
Club creditors up to the end of 2006, see Martin (2010). 
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for example, to the social impact of the crisis and its workout (Afrodad, 2011). 
The most positive aspect of the codes is the call to share information, which 
should be with all stakeholders, not just creditors, and transparency should apply not 
only to the government but also to the major creditors, such as on their gross and net 
exposure to the debtor.
13
 While these general principles of openness make good 
economic sense for reducing uncertainty when making public and private decisions, 
they may not make good financial sense for any of the parties trying to negotiate a debt 
workout deal. Thus, one must expect selective information disclosure by governments, 
especially during periods leading up to debt crises, and quite limited voluntary 
disclosure of exposure by negotiating creditors (for example on whether they had 
hedged their position with credit default swaps).  
Be that as it may, it is not even clear that cooperating with one‟s creditors in a 
crisis gives the best return to the debtor. Indeed, the people of Iceland recently voted to 
overturn their government‟s commitment to repay the British and Dutch governments, 
which covered Icelandic bank obligations to depositors from their countries. The 
unwillingness of Icelanders to pay seems very much tied to their sense of unfairness in 
the debt workout to which their government agreed. If the British and Dutch 
governments cannot overturn the decision through a European court, the uncooperative 
Icelandic taxpayers will have improved their workout at the expense of British and 
Dutch taxpayers. 
Moreover, Ecuador demonstrated in its unilateral December 2008 default on a 
set of bonds that a hostile approach to its creditors can pay high dividends, in this case a 
65% reduction of the debt (Buchheit and Gulati, 2009). It probably did not hurt that 
Ecuador‟s default came during the depths of the global financial crisis when eyes were 
elsewhere and that there had been popular domestic support for debt reduction, in part 
owing to a government-supported “audit” of the country‟s debt stock that found much 
of it to be “illegitimate” (Salmon, 2009 and link to article on the audit). Ecuador thus 
challenged the notion that countries never default voluntarily; the current government 
defaulted on bonds issued by a previous government on the ostensible grounds that 
there were problems with how and why the bonds were issued, but in fact it defaulted 
selectively and strategically at a moment of market opportunity (Porzecanski, 2010).  
If Iceland showed there are limits to public tolerance at being squeezed by 
financial interests (here in the form of foreign governments that chose to bail out their 
citizen depositors in failed Icelandic banks), Ecuador showed that a small debtor could 
game a system whose rules had been stacked in favor of the creditors. Iceland‟s 
challenge was at inter-governmental level. Ecuador rattled the emerging markets 
financial community on Wall Street. As Hans Humes, head of Greylock Capital 
Management, a major investor in emerging market debt, was quoted as saying, “As 
much as we can say this is an outlier, any country which runs into trouble has a great 
blueprint now of how to do it…Maybe [the solution is to] go back to Anne Krueger‟s 
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 Considerable data are already routinely published on country exposures of banks reporting to the Bank 
for International Settlements, with a one quarter lag; similarly, consolidated debt statistics including 
obligations to multilateral and bilateral creditors are jointly compiled (and compared) by four major 
international organizations on the Joint External Debt Hub (www.jedh.org). Nevertheless, data are more 
complete for some countries than others and in any case it is only during a crisis when creditors step 
forward with their claims (which must be vetted) that a full picture appears even in countries with 
efficient debt management offices.  
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model…If you‟re going to capitulate to Ecuador, then capitulating to the IMF is easy in 
comparison” (Salmon, 2009).  This is definitely a minority opinion in the financial 
world, the preferred model being the creditor-dominated “cooperative” relationship. 
But, it could be a straw in the wind about the reliability of the creditor-led model.  
Characteristics of a superior system 
“Krueger‟s model,” as referenced above, was the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM) proposed and rejected at IMF. While creating a bankruptcy type 
procedure under IMF auspices remains a highly controversial proposal, the point to 
take away is that it might be time for the international community to consider creating 
some international mechanism whose normal operations would be judged fair to 
debtors and creditors, that would be timely and efficient to operate, and that would 
create stronger ex ante incentives for appropriate borrowing and lending behavior.  
A sovereign debt workout mechanism would improve global economic and 
financial functioning, both in terms of financial sector operations and as regards 
development. Creating a sovereign debt workout mechanism is part and parcel of the 
systemic need to preserve a country‟s banking system, let alone deliver a fair deal to the 
country‟s citizens. Banks are traditionally major holders of sovereign debt and would 
have to absorb substantial losses from a sovereign default. This is said to be a concern 
today in Europe regarding the potential default of Greece, as it was in 2001 in 
Argentina during its default (Damill, Frenkel and Rapetti, 2010). But, not only can 
sovereign default trigger a banking crisis, a banking crisis can also create a sovereign 
debt crisis, as seen when the Icelandic and Irish governments took over the obligations 
of their failed banks, suddenly creating unsustainable sovereign debt levels for the 
countries. Indeed, concern does not lie exclusively in the financial sector, although 
bank takeovers are particularly common and costly.  It is also not unusual for 
developing country governments to take over financial obligations of large non-bank 
investments that fail, even if it raises their sovereign debt to an uncomfortable level.
14
  
Many developing countries, it should be said, have significantly strengthened 
their domestic  financial sectors and bolstered sovereign debt management, as well as 
significantly increased their foreign exchange reserves, and thus may seem less at risk 
of systemic difficulties that would cause or result from a sovereign insolvency. 
However, assessments might change. Two of the strongest economies on earth have 
been rocked by unforeseen catastrophes: the bursting of the speculative financial 
bubble in the United States (a man-made catastrophe) and the Japanese earthquake, 
tsunami and nuclear meltdown. Imagine these events happening in less robust 
economies.   
All in all, establishing a permanent sovereign debt workout mechanism would 
be a valuable international public good. It would remove one source of uncertainty 
impacting financial flows, as it would make clear what the process of debt crisis 
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 If the 2009 actions of Dubai in rescuing “Dubai World” only temporarily shook confidence in the 
Emirate‟s debt sustainability, the 1999 takeover of “Ottley Hall” by the government of St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines did imperil that small country‟s debt situation. Ottley Hall was a joint shipyard venture 
between St. Vincent‟s government and a group of private investors that failed in 1999, when the 
government took over responsibility for its debts, mainly owed to a group of Italian banks; in 2001 the 
government defaulted on the debts, wherein the Italian government took them over as guarantor and in 
2007 wrote them off (Herman, 2010a, p. 9).  
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resolution would entail should it become necessary. It would set standards for what 
constitutes an effective, timely and fair resolution of sovereign insolvencies. And to the 
degree that it made clear to creditors that they bore actual risks of non-payment or 
partial payment or delayed payment under particular circumstances, it would 
discourage lending into excessively risky circumstances. Risk-reducing improvements 
of this sort are in the global public interest, if not in the immediate interest of the 
stressed government that is essentially postponing its “day of reckoning.” It would thus 
lessen highly speculative and expensive short-term lending to countries with uncertain 
policies, direct more of international financial flows into capital formation in less risky 
countries, and strengthen the incentive for sound fiscal management. The payoff would 
be higher economic growth of developing countries, which is a prerequisite for 
sustainably reducing poverty, and possibly contribute to global aggregate demand.  
There are numerous proposals for what the institutional structure of a sovereign 
debt workout mechanism should look like, which need not be reviewed here (but see 
Kaiser, 2010). The actual shape of such a mechanism would best emerge from multi-
stakeholder discussions in an appropriate international forum, building toward 
consensus, and then inter-state negotiations to create the precise mechanism, which 
should thereby enjoy broad international “ownership.” One may nevertheless envisage 
key features of how such a mechanism should function.
15
   
First, the objective of the debt workout should be essentially the same “fresh 
start” that corporations are deemed to be given when they emerge from bankruptcy 
protection (Stiglitz, 2010). This requires that all the debt obligations of the government 
be addressed together in one comprehensive debt workout plan, which would leave the 
government with a debt level and scheduled debt servicing obligations over time that it 
is expected to be able to meet without further negotiated adjustment. There can be no 
guarantee that the government will not fall back into insolvency, but the prospects 
should be good for not doing so. Moreover, the degree of expenditure tightening to 
accommodate post-workout debt servicing should be limited so as to protect and 
possibly even increase essential government functions, not least social services for the 
poor. Efforts would also have to be made to protect legislated and contractual 
commitments to citizens, as for pensions. Furthermore, priority development 
investment, e.g., in infrastructure, should be protected.
16
  
Second, it is not clear how much more precise the guidance for the overall terms 
of the workout can be. The goal under the HIPC Initiative was that countries emerge 
from the program with a “sustainable” debt situation. However, it proved difficult to 
translate the concept into specific target levels of debt and debt servicing, as the initial 
targets first had to be interpreted for actual cases;
17
 then the targets were “enhanced” 
under a broad policy change; and finally they were rendered moot by the Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) which forgave all multilateral obligations of affected 
countries that had been incurred before one or another fixed date (Cosío-Pascal, 2010, 
pp. 248-251; Martin, 2010, pp. 283-293). With this experience in view, it seems best 
                                                 
15
 The ensuing is based on the concluding chapter of Herman, Ocampo and Spiegel (2010), except as 
otherwise noted. 
16
 As envisaged here, guidelines developed for the workout mechanism would supersede the provisions 
in bond and loan indentures, putting the proposal here in the category of “statutory” as opposed to 
“market-based” (or contract-based) debt workouts. 
17
 For example, in a target ratio of debt to exports, exports of which year or years or who‟s forecast of 
future exports (and whether baseline or alternative scenario) should be in the denominator? 
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that the international overseers responsible for a specific debt workout should apply 
approved general principles and otherwise build up precedents from actual cases, much 
as occurs in bankruptcy courts. 
Third, it is appropriate that all relevant stakeholders be heard when the process 
of shaping the workout is underway. This, of course, includes the different classes of 
creditors, who may be expected to form themselves into groups for negotiation, 
including one or more groups of bondholders, banks, Paris Club, etc. They would 
formally participate as parties to the workout. By the same token, representatives of the 
people in the country would participate as affected parties, including the executive and 
legislative branches of the debtor government. Indeed, civil society representatives, 
trade unions and business representatives that fear particularly harsh impacts should 
also be heard. Consultation of the workout mechanism with all of these stakeholders 
should be in the open and accessible to press coverage, while appreciating that some 




Fourth, as the aim of the exercise is to adjust the overall debt level and future 
debt-servicing profile, it is necessary for the workout mechanism to allocate the debt 
and debt-service adjustments to the various classes of creditors. While the workout 
overseer would be responsible for making concrete decisions (or accepting those agreed 
in a side negotiation by the involved parties), he or she should work under 
internationally approved general guidance. For example, the informal practice is to treat 
multilateral financial institution claims as senior to those of all other non-collateralized 
credits. This might be internationally endorsed, albeit with the proviso that these 
institutions might have to absorb losses if the debtor‟s prospects were sufficiently poor, 
i.e., senior but not inviolate.
19
 Other guidelines on repayment seniority in a sovereign 
debt workout could be specified. For example, seniority of private claims might be 
differentiated according to the age of the claim, as the current approach gives creditors 
who lend when default is approaching the same probability of repayment as lenders in 
pre-crisis times, diluting the claims of the previous lenders. Giving recent lenders lower 
priority might not only raise the degree of recovery on loans extended for sound 
reasons (and thus lower the risk premium on such loans), but also discourage pointless 
last-minute surges in borrowing before default (Bolton and Skeel, 2010, pp. 458-461). 
On the other hand, loans made after default and under the bankruptcy regime, on the 
model of “debtor-in-possession” (DIP) financing in corporate debt restructurings, 
whether extended by IMF, other public institutions or private banks, could be made 
senior to all other credits, even multilateral ones. Moreover, when governments 
temporarily nationalize their banking systems or corporations during a financial crisis, 
which then creates a sovereign debt crisis, the obligations arising from the bankrupt 
entities that thereby become government obligations should be dealt with separately 
from loans that originated as normal sovereign-risk credits. 
Fifth, not only should the workout determine the total amount of debt and debt-
                                                 
18
 There should be provision for appeal of a disappointed minority to a second judge or panel of judges, 
on the basis of minority rights, although the cause for such appeal would have to be spelled out and not 
be able to undo the normal “cram down” of a bankruptcy treatment.  
19
 The requirement under the HIPC Initiative that international financial institution (IFI) losses had to be 
covered with other sources of funds, making relief contingent on success in mobilizing donors, should 
also be dropped as unfair to the debtor in crisis; if IFIs need to hold larger loan-loss reserves, so be it, as 
they would still need to hold less than commercial institutions.  
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service restructuring, but it should seek a relatively quick implementation schedule, so 
as to remove uncertainty about the adjustment path envisaged for the country. At the 
same time, any accompanying package of new financing to help the country during the 
adjustment period should quickly be agreed in parallel with the workout program. As in 
current practice, IMF would presumably play a major role here, jointly with the World 
Bank in the case of low-income countries, both in providing and mobilizing other 
official transitional financing. If seniority were accorded to DIP financing, as noted 
above, private funds for the adjustment period might also be mobilized. 
Sixth, as in corporate bankruptcy, from the moment the insolvency process is 
invoked until the country emerges from it, the government should be protected from 
creditor actions in national courts. That is, individual creditors should not be able to 
recover their loans at the expense of others. Only a comprehensive workout would be 
permitted. It could begin with attempted mediation, with some form of arbitration 
available if progress is insufficient in the mediation phase.  
Seventh, the remaining question is who invokes the insolvency mechanism. In 
bankruptcy, it is commonly the debtor, which acknowledges its inability to make a 
coming payment. One unfortunate consequence at the sovereign level is that since 
bankruptcy is taken as a sign of failure, political authorities seem to delay that moment 
as long as possible, building up debt levels unnecessarily and reducing the recovery of 
all creditors (at least under existing seniority rules, as noted above). For precisely such 
reasons, insolvencies of commercial banks are handled differently, as in the United 
States, where the government insures bank deposits and thus has a strong interest in 
stopping the mushrooming of unpayable bank liabilities. In this case, the government 
decides when to put the bank into “receivership,” an intriguing but politically 
impossible model for insolvent sovereign governments.
20
 
The political case for reform 
As in all things political, the obstacle to creating such a workout mechanism has 
been the opposition of powerful actors: creditors have power – being either 
governments themselves or private creditors who enjoy the support of their 
governments. Private creditors have also been supported by the authorities of their 
largest sovereign customers, whose opposition to systemic reform would stem from 
concern about its impact on access to new loans or loans on more onerous terms.
21
 As a 
                                                 
20
 As a US bank‟s situation deteriorates, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) would at 
some point grow concerned and issue warnings to the bank, try to locate a prospective merger partner 
and as a last resort, take it over. The FDIC appears without warning at the door of an insolvent bank on a 
Friday night after the bank has closed for the day and literally takes it over, reopening on Monday under 
government management. The objective is to minimize depositor panic and maintain normal basic 
banking operations, an essential public utility. Could this model work for insolvent sovereigns? The 
equivalent would be a takeover of the government by the international community, which  seems totally 
unacceptable.  Presumably, no sovereign government would tolerate being taken over by IMF, even if it 
were managed in a way that met all the complaints ever made about IMF. Still, it is an intriguing 
alternative model (Private communications with Patrick Bolton, Columbia University, March 2011).  
21
 Another factor may be the confidence of emerging economy authorities (and their private creditors) 
that substantial bailout funding would be available on acceptable conditions (appreciation to José 
Antonio Ocampo for suggesting this point). Indeed, private creditors were highly disturbed at the end of 
the 1990s when IMF began to make “bail ins” (also called “private sector participation”) as opposed to 
bailouts part of its international policy statements (see Herman, 2010, pp. 391-395). Both the return to 
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result, sovereign debt workouts are usually biased towards the interests of the creditors. 
Either debtors accept that or in infrequent cases have countervailing power to obtain a 
more favorable outcome or the debt is left unresolved. The Soviet Union repudiated the 
Czar‟s bonds in 1918 and payment did not resume on them until the late 1980s. Life 
went on; but life could have been better. 
History tells us that creating a new international mechanism will not be easy. 
Thus, we must first ask if there is an alternative. If debt crises can be prevented, there is 
no need to fight for a workout mechanism. Is it possible through cautious fiscal 
management to prevent the buildup of sovereign debt levels that somehow become 
excessive? One approach would be to abjure any borrowing or more than in very 
modest amounts. However, the opportunity cost of that is so high in terms of 
investment foregone and low standards of living in the borrowing countries that it is not 
a strategy that societies are willing to adopt. Debt has a place in good fiscal 
management. The challenge is to use it safely because it has dangers.  
So, then, the question may be posed, can borrowing instruments be made less 
dangerous? In this spirit, there are several proposals to introduce financial instruments 
that share repayment risks between borrower and lender other than through default, 
such as bonds or official loans whose repayment obligations would be linked to growth 
of gross domestic product or export commodity prices. Another proposal is to revive 
the “bisque” clause used in Anglo-American loan agreements of the 1940s and 1950s 
under which the borrower (United Kingdom) could at its own option (as from 1956) 
decide to delay a payment under difficult economic circumstances (Cosío-Pascal, 2010, 
pp. 235 and 259). With such financial instruments, debt-servicing obligations fall when 
ability to pay falls and rise when it rises. There has been considerable discussion of 
these concepts at a philosophical (e.g., Reddy, 2007) and practical level (e.g., Griffith-
Jones and Sharma 2006; Claessens 2010, especially pp. 84-87), but very few actual 
financial instruments have been created in the public or private lending sectors other 
than as part of a debt crisis workout or as part of development cooperation.
22
 However, 
there is a growing interest in the international community in this subject, with the IMF 
and World Bank, as well as the Commonwealth Secretariat, studying the subject of 
counter-cyclical lending. It must be that buyers of sovereign bonds or issuers of official 
credits – at least those on commercial terms – are unwilling to share risk beyond that of 
default (“credit risk”) with the borrowing governments when lending to them.
23
  
                                                                                                                                              
large-scale funding during the recent global financial crisis and the approach taken in the European debt 
difficulties seem to signal a return to creditor bailouts over “bail ins.” 
22
 In particular, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) has introduced a program of highly 
concessional counter cyclical loans (“prêt très concessionnel contracyclique”). These loans shorten a 
previous standard 10-year grace period to 5 years but give countries the option of not paying principal in 
any ensuing year, up to 5 years total, over the remaining life of the loan, depending on shocks to their 
repayment capacity, for example, owing to trade-price changes (called a “flexible grace period”); if the 
borrower does not use all five years of additional grace, the remainder is credited against its final 
payments so as not to over-repay the loan (for background, see Djoufelkit-Cottenet and Valadier, 2008, 
pp. 19-22). From initiation in 2007 to 2010 such loans have been extended to five low-income countries 
(Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Tanzania and Mozambique), according to AFD (appreciation to Stephany 
Griffith-Jones for bringing this to my attention). 
23
 On the other hand, the global financial sector has created securities that act like insurance policies and 
absorb risks, such as catastrophe and weather-related bonds, which have found voluntary markets, albeit 
limited ones (see Claessens, 2010, p. 83 and references cited therein). They are not necessarily cheap 
ways to hedge risk. The international community has also adopted a policy option for very poor countries 
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 One may expect sovereign debt crises will never disappear, however much we 
may hope that they are infrequent. If insolvency cannot be ruled out, can the need for 
an explicit workout mechanism still be obviated? One possibility would be if 
international policy were so structured that no sovereign defaults were permitted, 
assuring that creditors are always paid fully and on a timely basis. Logically, there are 
two possibilities: bailouts and a full debtor country squeeze. Bailouts of insolvent 
government by other governments, as have been used thus far in Europe, have not been 
popular, even with an accompanying tight squeeze on debtor country citizens, as 
taxpayers of one country do not want to bear the burden of the taxpayers of another 
country. To make matters worse politically, the creditors (at least private creditors) 
have all along been compensated through interest rate premiums for taking the risk that 
their loans will not be repaid, and so it seems only fair for them to share the pain when 
the borrower actually cannot pay.
24
 Equally, it is not always a credible option to hold 
governments responsible to repay all the debts they accumulate regardless of the pain it 
inflicts. This is for the same reason that debtors‟ prisons are no longer in vogue: it is 
unconscionable to most people for creditors, whether the local or international wealthy, 
to squeeze living standards of lower income people beyond some limit.  
Thus, when an excessive debt situation reaches a point of insolvency, the 
workout should entail a shared sacrifice of debtors and creditors. Full compensation of 
all creditors all the time is simply not tenable. It is just not fair (Herman, 2007). 
Determining the shares of the burden asked of the sovereign debtor and its creditors – 
and how the different creditors should share their part of the burden – are essential 
features of the debt workout. That job today is done in the informal and ad hoc ways 
discussed above, rewarding the politically powerful or politically necessary (Iraq), but 
not necessarily the needy. This situation begs for improvement. 
If the argument is thus strong for trying to create an explicit sovereign debt 
workout mechanism, is this a propitious time to launch a fight with private and official 
creditors to create it? Rahm Emanuel, the new mayor of Chicago and US President 
Barack Obama‟s former chief of staff famously said in November 2008 “You never 
want a serious crisis to go to waste”.
25
 But subsequent experience suggests that 
effective reform does not necessarily get done this way. It seems the lesson of the 
financial regulation reform effort – at least in the United States where the financial 
sector continues to fight to weaken it – is that unless you complete the reform while 
fear is high, the financial sector will succeed in protecting its private interests and roll 
back the reforms, even if it risks the sector‟s own broad interests.
26
 Also, the primary 
concern of the United States and Europe during the crisis of 2007-9 was to rescue the 
creditors, not curb their self-destructive behaviors. By the same token, the most 
                                                                                                                                              
experiencing devastating natural catastrophes, such as Haiti‟s 2010 earthquake, namely, donor 
government voluntary suspension of bilateral debt servicing obligations and special arrangements to 
cover multilateral debt servicing payments falling due, such as the Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust 
established by the International Monetary Fund in 2010 (IMF 2010a). 
24
 Indeed, evidence is that investors in emerging market country bonds have been generously 
compensated for bearing risks that have rarely caused them to suffer any losses (see Spiegel, 2010). 
25
 As cited by the Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2008  
26
 It seems that financial market participants have dual personalities. While one personality can step back 
and see the systemic risks and regulatory failings, the other personality only sees the proposed regulatory 
corrections as limits on its particular operations and earnings, with the latter personality apparently the 
dominant one  today (see Rude (1999) for an examination of the dual personalities on Wall Street during 
the Asian financial crisis). 
 15 
 
propitious time to advance consideration of a debt workout mechanism seems not to be 
in the midst of widespread sovereign debt crises.  
In fact, the short-term outlook may be one of relative financial calm as regards 
the sovereign debts of developing countries, as noted earlier.  The principal danger is if 
the “romance” with austerity in some of the major developed economies reduces 
growth of world demand and trade and possibly tips the world back into recession; then 
the debt outlook in developing countries would sour. On the other hand, the medium-
term prospects are quite cloudy, especially as capital flows remain potentially volatile. 
In addition, the outlook for official development assistance becomes important for 
those countries that are primarily dependent on official flows to roll over and expand 
borrowings, as aid commitments of some countries have become more uncertain in 
recent time due to fiscal pressures from the global crisis.  
Finally, even if the current moment of relative calm is propitious for launching a 
debt initiative, it will surely be a fight. Private and official beneficiaries of the status 
quo will defend their interests. Nevertheless, financial interests in some developed 
countries continually amaze with their arrogance and greed and it seems that taxpayers 
are less willing to defer to their interests than before. If political mobilization to fight 
those interests gathers momentum, special interests could be overcome. Perhaps the 
sovereign borrowers who helped kill the SDRM in 2003 would also not protest so 
loudly now, especially if the end result was a system that reduced uncertainty and made 
clear how debts would be handled. Indeed, it is very possible that, just as introducing 
collective action clauses into New York law bonds did not raise interest costs to 
sovereign borrowers, establishing a sovereign debt workout mechanism might impose 
no additional cost on sovereign borrowing. 
Conclusion: Next Steps? 
The argument of this paper has been that the international financial system is 
missing an important mechanism through which to resolve – hopefully only occasional 
but typically very costly – sovereign insolvencies. Although in the past international 
policy makers have thought about one set of policy responses to sovereign debt crises 
in “market-access”  countries (SDRM, collective action clauses for New York law 
bonds, codes of conduct, Evian Approach of Paris Club) and a different set of responses 
for low-income countries that mainly borrow from official creditors (HIPC Initiative, 
MDRI, Evian Approach), this paper calls for creation of a single mechanism that could 
be used by countries at any level of development, including possibly members of the 
European Union.  
The argument was not made that a new mechanism is required to restructure 
debts of one group of countries or another. The informal and ad hoc processes that have 
been available will continue to be available, and will surely adjust in one way or 
another to reflect the changing creditor landscape. In this regard, the existing system is 
already a very flexible one, calling on different creditor classes to organize themselves 
however they see fit for negotiation with a given debtor government in crisis. Rather, 
the call here for a new mechanism is made to achieve superior workouts from the 
perspective of development effectiveness, overall fairness and to send signals to the 




The paper also eschewed specifying what form the new mechanism should take, 
e.g., whether it should be an international court of some sort or an international 
arbitration service. It seemed more useful to spell out how the mechanism should 
function, highlighting the processes that could raise confidence that the outcomes 
would meet effectiveness, timeliness and fairness imperatives.  
Indeed, the paper also calls for international debate about what such a 
mechanism should look like. As mentioned at the outset, almost a decade ago the 
international community called for deliberations in the appropriate forums on precisely 
a proposal such as considered in this paper. It could be added that the call has been 
reiterated in subsequent United Nations conferences and meetings of the General 
Assembly,
27
 and merely awaits an agreement among the major and emerging powers to 
restart the discussion, which would perforce either be in or centrally involve the Bretton 
Woods institutions.  
Thus far, the financial industries and government authorities of several 
important countries have simply not been interested. Apparently, the current system 
works well enough for them or they fear that reform might not serve their interests. To 
actually restart the substantive policy debate in a global forum instead of repeatedly – 
and now almost routinely – calling for its consideration requires a consensus of 
Member States and thus disinterested governments can block the process.  
However, the intellectual, technical and political discussion to start developing 
the proposal does not need to begin in a global forum, although it does need to reflect a 
balance of interests. If a balanced group of interested governments could agree to start 
the discussions among themselves, inviting essential institutional and non-state 
stakeholders to help them, they could develop a credible proposal. Reform is always 
risky, and thus political leadership to take up an initiative is necessary to start the 
reform process.   
When the group of governments agrees to a proposal, it could very well bring it 
to an appropriate global forum for further negotiation on its details, global endorsement 
and implementation. That forum could be a global conference, perhaps held under 
United Nations auspices but with the active support of the Bretton Woods institutions at 
the conference and in its preparatory process.
28
 The preparatory process would need to 
have participation of finance and foreign ministries, and specialists in finance and 
international law.  
If certain major governments still block moving at this stage to a global 
discussion, interested governments could come together on an ad hoc basis and create 
the insolvency mechanism as an ad hoc facility offered for use by any government in 
need. It is possible that a very large number of countries would participate, as is the 
case, for example, in the UN Law of the Sea, the UN Convention on the Prohibition of 
Land Mines, or the International Criminal Court. It is also possible that a group of 
countries that starts small gathers adherents as its deliberations proceed and 
international interest grows in its work. Indeed, the “Leading Group on Innovative 
                                                 
27
 This includes the outcome of the September 2010 UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals 
(United Nations 2010, paragraph 78(r)) and the December 2010 General Assembly debt resolution 
(United Nations 2010a, paragraph 26). 
28




Financing for Development” was begun in 2004 by the Presidents of France, Brazil and 
Chile, joined later by Spain; it held a first conference of interested governments in 2006 
attended by 44 countries, of which 17 signaled their intention to introduce the air-ticket 
solidarity levy, which has in fact been introduced by several governments;  today it 
comprises 63 member countries, international institutions, important foundations and 
civil society organizations. 
29
  
The remaining question is which country or countries are willing to take the 
first step forward. 
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